INTRODUCTION
Turnover of incubation eggs is one of the most signifi cant factors for flock maintenance and production rates in the world poultry industry. According to the Institute for Agricultural Market Studies' assessment incubation egg imports had increased more than twice between 2010 and 2015, from 300-330 mln up to 700 mln per year. Domestic production also was on rise increasing by 200-300 mln annually and reached to 2.9 bln in 2015. While experts recognize that there are no precise statistical data for this sector [1] . However, besides evident benefits turnover of incubation eggs is associated with risks of thransbound ary spread of avian infectious diseases including avian influenza, Newcastle disease, infectious bursal disease, Marek's disease, turkey rhinotracheitis, duck hepatitis, fowl typhoid, pullorum disease, fowl cholera, mycoplasmosis and ornithosis [10] .
Avian influenza virus spread in poultry [22, 28] in ad dition to its spread in wild birds [24] has had a significant impact on limitation of international trade in poultry pro ducts over the last few years.
Taking into account that turnover of incubation eggs is of high importance for the Russian Federation, as well as significance of their import and complicated epidemic situation on avian influenza in the world it would be worth considering the risk of AI virus transmission through incu bation eggs.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Official data of the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) on avian influenza epidemic situation in vari ous countries in the world were used [30] . Documents, scientific publications and published data on risk assessment were analyzed by traditional analysis methods using content analysis elements as complex logical constructions aimed at showing the substantial content. Assessment of the risk associated with trade in incubation eggs was performed using qualitative risk as sessment method [14] modified by N. Murray [20] taking into account commoditybased approach recommended by the OIE [13] .
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Hazard identification. Pathogen. According to the OIE, avian influenza is an infection of poultry caused by type A avian influenza virus.
The disease is classified into two types depending on the virus pathogenicity: highly pathogenic and low patho genic avian influenza (HPAI and LPAI) [27] .
Asian lineage of Н5N1 HPAI is able to infect many poul try and wild bird species and even mammals. Reassortant viruses of such type containing H5N1 virus genome seg ments (for example, H5N2, H5N5 and H5N8 viruses) were detected in poultry and in mammals [7] .
H9N2 AI virus (LPAI) widely spread in poultry in the Near East and Asian countries and was detected in humans [15] . The virus of such subtype was also detected in pigs and in dogs [31] .
H5N1 HPAI viruses persist in the environment for a short period as compared to H5 low pathogenic avian influenza viruses [25] . LPAI viruses isolated from wild waterfowl remains infectious for 207 days at 17 °С and for 102 days at 28 °С. Some factors influence the virus persistence in water: temperature, pH level and salinity. The viruses demonstrate the highest stability at рН 7.4-8.2, low temperature (8-17 °С) and low water salinity (0-20,000 ppm) [6, 21] .
Field observations carried out by some researchers suppose that LPAI viruses can survive in feces for 105 days under unspecified conditions; AI viruses remained viable for 1-7 days at 15-35 °C under controlled conditions. At lower temperatures (4 °C) the virus survivability in feces varied from less than 4 up to 30-40 days in different experi ments. The virus persistence on different surfaces and in soil protected from sunlight varied from 2 days up to more than 2 weeks (and possibly for several months) at 4 °C up to 15-30 °C. The virus can persist on feathers for longer time. In bird meat (pH 7.0) the virus persists for 6 months at 4 °C. Environmental sampling in Cambodia showed that AI viruses could not persist for a long time under tropical climate conditions. Despite of frequent H5N1 Asian line age HPAIV RNA detection in many samples (for example, in soil and straw) the virus was successfully isolated only once, in one stagnant water body [7] .
Russian researchers also noted that high humidity, neu tral environment and low temperatures could promote the virus survival in environment [3] .
As of January-May 2017, the following type A HPAI vi rus subtypes were registered in the world: H5, H5N1, H5N2, H5N5, H5N6, H5N9, H7N1, H7N3, H7N9 but H5N8 virus pre vailed based on the number of outbreaks. HPAI outbreaks in wild birds and poultry were reported in the following countries: Austria, Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Great Britain, Hungary, Vietnam, Germany, Hong Kong, Greece, Denmark, Egypt (endemic since 2008), Israel, India, Iran, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Kazakh stan, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Kuwait, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Rus sia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, United States of America, Taiwan, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Finland, France, Croatia, Czech Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, South Korea, Japan [29] .
The following countries were officially registered as LPAIinfected in 2017 (January-May): Germany (H5N1, H5N2, H5N3), Cambodia (H7N3), Libya (H7), Netherlands (H7N9), United States of America (H5N2 -wild birds, H7N9), France (H5N1, H5N2, H5N3, H5N9) , Chile (H7N6), Republic of South Africa (H5N2, H7N9) [29] .
Probability of risk for the virus transmission through commodity. For transmission of avian infectious diseases through incubation eggs their etiological agents should be able to infect targeted poultry species or spread in re productive tract and persist on egg surface or penetrate though egg shell and infect the egg content prior or after egg laying.
LPAIcaused infection in poultry can result in egg pro duction drop but more often symptoms of respiratory tract infection are registered. The disease manifestations are as follows: ataxia and rarely diarrhea, depression, ruffled feathers. Pancreatic necrosis was reported in turkeys [8] .
It should be recognized that there were no reports on infection of bird eggs with LPAI viruses while H7N2 virus infectionassociated salpingitis and slight to moderate egg production drop were reported in some studies [9] .
Although it is recognized that HPAI infection mani fests by systemic lesions in organs (bursa, thymus, spleen, heart, pancreas, kidneys, brain, trachea, lungs, adrenals, skeletal muscles) the evidence of actual vertical transmis sion of HPAI is limited [16, 25] . H5N2 HPAI virus was iso lated from yolk and white of eggs derived from naturally infected [17] and experimentally infected [19] chickens. According to nonpublished studies cited by D. E. Swayne and J. R. Beck [26] , it was demonstrated that HPAI virus was present in 85-100% of eggs placed for incubation 3-4 days after experimental infection of poultry. How ever, HPAI virus is lethal for embryos and no incubation of infected eggs has been demonstrated in experiments. Epidemic investigation of HPAI spread in Netherlands in 2003 showed that mechanical transmission through con taminated eggs and egg trays could be significant factor for the disease spread [23] .
Only one case of transovarian AIV transmission namely А/Silver gull/Astrakhan 458/85 Н13N6 virus isolation in cloacal swab from silver gull youngling that had no con tact with outside environment was described in reviewed relevant Russian scientific literature [5] .
No information on specific cases of LPAI introduction to poultry establishments through introduced/moved incubation eggs was found during the review of foreign and Russian scientific literature. However, based on avail able data it can be concluded that probability of LPAI virus transmission through poultry incubation eggs appears to be primarily limited to possible contamination of egg sur face, package with the said agents while despite of limited evidence of HPAI vertical transmission the HPAI virus was isolated from the egg yolk and surface. Therewith, it is rec ognized that HPAI causes systemic lesions in organs and probability of HPAI virus transmission through marketable eggs of quails, turkeys, geese and fowl is high and these are confirmed by published studies [12, 17, 18] .
Risk mitigation measures. Taking into account limited data on association of natural AI infection with the virus transmission through incubation eggs the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (hereinafter, the Code) recommenda tions on safe trade in incubation eggs regardless of the vi rus pathogenicity (Art. 10.4.10) are undoubtedly adequate for international avian influenza spread prevention during export/import.
It may be noted based on analyzed EU measures for avi an influenza control [11] that they, inter alia, include bans on egg movements regardless of avian influenza patho genicity. Therewith, eggs as well as poultry, feeds, meat, humans and fomites are considered potential sources of AI introduction to an establishment and AI spread between establishments.
However, breeding establishments that produce incu bation eggs and dayold chicks for export carry out tests in accordance with Art. 10.4.32 of the Code [27] . There with, it should be noted that according to the said Article additional requirements for surveillance for recognition of AI freedom of the establishment include evidence of HPAI and LPAI infection absence. Poultry kept at such establishments should be tested for the virus detection or isolation based on randomized sampling and using se rological methods in accordance with the Code general requirements. The tests should be carried out at intervals that depend on risk of the infection spread but at least every 21 days.
Although diagnostic significance of serological surveys is commonly recognized, the importance of animal clinical examinationbased surveillance should not be underesti mated. Article 10.4 of the Code states that the main goal of clinical surveillance is detection of AI clinical signs, first of all HPAI signs at flock level.
Monitoring of production indicators such as mortality increase, decrease in feed or water intake, detection of res piratory signs, drop in egg production is a major factor for early detection of both HPAI and LPAI.
Decrease in feed intake and in egg production some times is the only indicator of LPAI virus presence. Clinical surveillance and laboratory tests should complement each other and be carried out consecutively to clarify the situ ation.
Results of serological survey (randomized or stochastic) allow the absence of the infection caused by AI viruses in a country, zone or compartment to be strongly proved. This underlines the importance of thorough documenting of performed tests [27] .
Based on data presented in the Figure incubation egg turnoverassociated AI virus spread cannot be excluded. Besides, no country has proved yet AI absence in its terri tory that is why, the associated risk cannot be insignificant (import poses a risk) and evidence of the disease freedom of the commodity source is applicable to individual pro duction establishments (compartments). Standard quar antine measures currently in place in the Russian Federa tion that are equivalent to the OIE recommendations [2, 4] can be considered effective against avian influenza viruses.
CONCLUSION
Probability of LPAI virus transmission through poultry incubation eggs appears to be primarily limited to pos sible contamination of egg surface and package while despite of limited evidence of HPAI vertical transmission the HPAI virus was isolated from egg yolk. Taking into ac count limited data on association of natural AI infection with the virus transmission through incubation eggs the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code recommendations are currently the most appropriate for international avian influenza spread prevention during trade regardless the virus pathogenicity.
Risk associated with avian influenza spread (regardless the virus pathogenicity) during trade in incubation eggs providing that the OIE recommended measures were implemented was assessed as "more than insignificant".
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